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IMPROVING BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
PHILIPPE AGHION
OLIVER HART
JOHN MOORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a widespread dissatisfaction with bankruptcy procedures
throughout the world. Bankruptcy reform is being actively considered in
the United Kingdom and France and is in the air in the United States. East
European countries that must select a bankruptcy law for their new
capitalistic economies have had a hard time making the choice and in some
cases, dissatisfied with their original decisions, are already making
changes.' Russia has recently implemented a bankruptcy law that seems
complex and apparently suffers from many of the disadvantages of Western
procedures.2
We believe the reason for this unsettled state of affairs is that bankruptcy
law has developed in a fairly haphazard manner, as a series of attempts to
solve perceived immediate problems. There has been relatively little effort
to step back and ask what the goals of bankruptcy procedure should be, or
to consider how one would set up an optimal bankruptcy procedure if one
were starting from scratch. To put it another way, economic analy-
sis-which has been applied with such great success to other aspects of law
in the last thirty years-has, with a few notable exceptions, not been used
to shed light on optimal bankruptcy procedure
* Nuffield College, Oxford; Harvard University; and London School of Economics and
University of Edinburgh, respectively. We would like to thank Rabindran Abraham, Barry Adler,
Donald Franklin, Lynn LoPucki, Paul Sheard, Andrei Shleifer, and Geoff Stewart for helpful comments
on earlier versions of this article.
1. An example is the case of Hungary. In the original Hungarian bankruptcy law, the debtor was
obliged to announce a reorganization or bankruptcy procedure after 90 days of failure to pay any of its
debt. This triggered a huge wave of bankruptcies, and in mid-1993 an amendment to the bankruptcy
law abolished the mandatory announcement of bankruptcy. See INSTITUTE FOR EAST-WEST STUDIES,
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY IN RUSSIA: CRITICAL RECOmMENDATIONS FOR MICROECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING (1993).
2. See id.
3. The notable exceptions include Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 101 HARY. L. RE%,. 775 (1988); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
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This Article attempts to provide an economic perspective on bankruptcy
procedure. In Parts II and III, we discuss the rationale for, and goals of,
bankruptcy procedure. Part IV describes how existing procedures fall short
of these goals. Our main point is that reorganization procedures like
Chapter 11 are flawed because they mix the decision of who should get
what with the decision of what should happen to the bankrupt company.
In Part V, we turn to a procedure that we have proposed elsewhere, which
we believe would improve on existing procedures.4 In our scheme, debt
claims are converted into equity, and the decision about whether to
reorganize or liquidate is then put to a vote. The merit of the scheme is
that all claimants, once they are shareholders, have a common interest in
voting for the efficient outcome. In Part VI, we discuss some practical
difficulties concerning our proposal and how they might be resolved. Part
VII contains concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
Companies take on debt for many reasons. To mention just a few: they
may wish to reduce taxes; they may wish to commit themselves to reduce
slack; or they may wish to signal that future prospects are good. Whatever
the reason, there will be circumstances, arising perhaps from an unexpected
shock, in which the company will be unable to pay its debts. Bankruptcy
law is concerned with what should happen in such situations.
The analysis of optimal bankruptcy law is complicated by the following
observation. In an ideal world, debtors and creditors would anticipate the
possibility of default and specify as part of their initial contracts what
should happen in a default state: in particular, whether the company should
be reorganized or liquidated and how its value should be divided up among
the various creditors. In other words, the parties would provide their own
bankruptcy procedure: there would be no need for a state-provided
bankruptcy procedure.
In practice, transaction costs are likely to be too large for debtors and
creditors to craft their own bankruptcy procedures, particularly in situations
where debtors acquire new assets and new creditors as time passes.
LAW (1986); and Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganizations, 83
COLUM. L. RBV. 527 (1983).
4. See Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 523 (1992). This procedure is currently under consideration in the United Kingdom.
It appears as Appendix E in THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986: COMPANY
VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS AND ADMINISTRATION ORDERS, A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (1993).
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Instead, parties may prefer to rely on a "standard form" bankruptcy
procedure provided by the state. It is a long way from this observation,
however, to any conclusions about the nature of such a standard-form
procedure. The problem is that the theory of optimal contracting in the
presence of transaction costs (the "theory of incomplete contracts") is in its
infancy. In particular, we are aware of no formal analysis that both
explains why it is rational for parties to leave out of their contract what
should happen in a default state and shows how a state-provided procedure
can improve matters.5
Thus, in what follows we do not derive an optimal bankruptcy procedure
from first principles. Instead our approach is to use economic theory to
guide us as to the nature of a "good" bankruptcy procedure. In the next
section we suggest some goals that an efficient bankruptcy procedure
should satisfy. Later (in Part V), we describe a procedure that we believe
meets these goals. Although we do not claim that our procedure is optimal,
we think that it is practical and avoids some of the pitfalls of existing
procedures. Also, the procedure is sufficiently simple and natural that
future work may show it to be optimal within a reasonable class of
procedures.6
It is also worth pointing out that, while we propose our procedure for use
by the state, it could, in principle, also be adopted by companies of their
own accord. In other words, to the extent that a company can opt out of
existing bankruptcy procedures, it may wish to select our procedure-as a
mechanism for resolving financial distress-as part of its initial contracts
with its creditors.
III. GOALS OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
As noted, we do not proceed from first principles. However, on the
basis of economic theory, we believe that the following are desirable goals
for a bankruptcy procedure. As we shall see, some of these goals may
conflict.
5. The fundamental importance of transaction costs has been stressed by Ronald H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FiRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). For a recent
discussion of the difficulties of analyzing the state's role in filling in the gaps of contracts, see Oliver
Hart, Is "Bounded Rationality" an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?, 146 J. INSTITUTION-
AL & THEORETICAL ECON. 696 (1990).
6. We do not believe that our procedure should be mandatory. Anybody who wishes to deviate
from it and craft their own procedure should be allowed to do so.
1994]
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First (goal 1), a good bankruptcy procedure should try to achieve an ex
post efficient outcome (that is, an outcome that maximizes the total value
of the proceeds-measured in money terms-received by existing
claimants). The efficient outcome may be to close the company down and
sell off the assets for cash, to sell the company as a going concern for cash,
or to reorganize the company.7 Second (goal 2), a good bankruptcy
procedure should give managers the right ex ante incentives to avoid
bankruptcy. In particular, a good procedure should not favor incumbent
managers, although it should not preclude them from retaining their jobs
if the bankruptcy was due to bad luck rather than bad management.
Third (goal 3), a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve absolute
priority. That is, the most senior creditors should be paid off before
anything is given to the next most senior creditors, and so on down the
ladder (with ordinary shareholders at the bottom). Finally, as a fourth goal
(goal 4), a good bankruptcy procedure should, whenever possible, put
ultimate decisionmaking power in the hands of the claimants rather than in
the hands of the judiciary or experts.
Let us briefly discuss the rationale for goals 1-4. Goal 1 simply reflects
the idea that, other things being equal, more is preferred to less; in
particular, if a procedure can be modified to deliver higher total ex post
value, then, given that absolute priority is preserved (i.e., goal 3),
everybody will be better off. Goal 2 reflects the idea that debt may have
an important role in constraining or bonding managers to act in the interest
of claimholders. Managers may have taken on debt at an earlier stage as
a way of committing themselves to reduce slack.8 A bankruptcy procedure
that lets managers off too lightly if they fail to pay their debts-for
example, by favoring them in the reorganization process-will interfere
with the ex ante bonding role of debt.
7. Note that we exclude "external" considerations from our definition of efficiency: that is, we
assume that the important benefits and costs have been incorporated into the valuation of the firm. For
example, we do not include such items as the external benefit from maintaining employment in the local
area. Our view is that if there are external considerations, government action may indeed be warranted,
but bankruptcy law is the wrong instrument for dealing with such considerations. It would be better
to have a general employment subsidy to save jobs than to distort bankruptcy procedures in order to
save bad firms.
8. The use of debt as a bonding device presumably arises because other devices to keep
management in check-incentive schemes, proxy fights, and takeovers-cannot always be relied upon.
The stimulus for the increase in debt might have been a hostile takeover bid that management was
trying to resist; or management might have been trying to raise funds from the capital market and found
it necessary to issue debt in order to convince the market that it would use the funds wisely. For more
on this issue, see Aghion et al., supra note 4.
[VOL. 72:849
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Absolute priority (i.e., goal 3) is desirable for several reasons. First, it
corresponds to what the parties contracted for outside of bankruptcy; that
is, if the company were sold outside bankruptcy and there were not enough
cash to pay creditors off, senior creditors would be paid off, followed by
junior creditors, and so on. If contracts are not upheld within bankruptcy,
creditors, particularly senior ones, may be less willing to lend to the
company in the first place. In addition, as Jackson has argued, any
discrepancy between what a class of claimants receives inside bankruptcy
and what it receives outside bankruptcy could lead to inefficient rent-
seeking-some people bribing management into deliberately precipitating
bankruptcy, and other people attempting to forestall bankruptcy. 9
Second, the priority of a company's capital structure provides an
important instrument for constraining management's ability to raise fresh
capital. Under certain circumstances, for example, management may issue
senior debt-which mops up earnings from assets in place-in order to
restrain itself from raising further capital in the future to fund unprofitable,
but empire-enhancing projects. This ability to commit to profitable projects
will be weakened to the extent that the seniority of initial claims is not
respected, i.e., to the extent that new claims issued at a later date are not
treated as junior to existing claims in a bankruptcy procedure."t
Goal 4 simply captures the idea that it is better to put decisions in the
hands of claimants who suffer the consequences of these decisions than in
the hands of outsiders (judges, insolvency practitioners) who do not. This
does not mean, of course, that the advice of experts may not be very useful
to claimants when they make their decisions-in fact, they may simply
follow this advice (for more on this, see Part V).
Although we believe that goals 1-4 have great appeal, they are not
beyond question. Bankruptcy scholars have raised doubts about goal 3 in
particular. Critics argue that if equityholders get little or nothing in a
bankruptcy proceeding, then management-acting on the equityholders'
behalf-will engage in highly risky, but inefficient, behavior when a
company is close to bankruptcy, because while the shareholders gain if
things go well, it is the creditors that lose if things go badly."
9. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 21.
10. For further details, see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role
of Hard Claims in Constraining Management, 85 AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
1 I. See Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1989, at
129, 149 (1989) ("As long as streamlining the bankruptcy procedure involves compensating creditors
according to the [absolute priority rule], then managers will have an incentive to gamble with creditors'
19941
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We are skeptical about this argument. It supposes that management acts
on behalf of shareholders, an assumption that may be plausible for small
owner-managed companies, but which is questionable for large, public
companies. The recent theoretical literature on agency costs and capital
structure argues that it is more reasonable to suppose that management is
self-interested." Under these conditions, there is a case for making
bankruptcy procedure less harsh for managers-to prevent them from
engaging in highly risky behavior to save their jobs-but this is already
covered under goal 2."3
Even in the case of small, owner-managed companies, it is far from clear
that departures from absolute priority are the best way to soften the blow
of bankruptcy. A better method might be to give managers and/or owners
a golden parachute in the form of senior debt.
Given the above, we shall assume that goals 1-4 are desirable, ceteris
paribus. It is worth noting, however, that the procedure we propose in Part
V could easily be modified to allow for departures from absolute priority
if this was found to be a desirable goal.
A final important point to make is that some of the four goals may be
in conflict. For example, suppose incumbent management has special
skills. In that situation, ex post efficiency (goal 1) might call for the
incumbent management of a bankrupt company to be retained. However,
knowing this, management might have little incentive to avoid bankruptcy,
i.e., goal 2 would not be served. 4
In view of this, it is unlikely that any bankruptcy procedure can achieve
all of the four goals. The best we can probably hope for is a reasonable
balance between these goals-particularly goals 1 and 2. The procedure
discussed in Part V is constructed with this in mind. Although we feel that
it does a satisfactory job in this respect, the procedure could quite easily be
fine-tuned if the balance were felt to be wrong; we return to this point in
the conclusion.
assets as they try desperately to avoid bankruptcy's draconian treatment of equity under the [absolute
priority rule].").
12. For a recent survey of this literature, see Oliver Hart, Theories of Optimal Capital Stncture:
A Managerial Discretion Perspective, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED
BuYouTs MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993).
13. In addition, in order to prevent managers from delaying a bankruptcy filing for too long, it
may be desirable to give creditors greater powers to push a company into involuntary bankruptcy.
14. The conflict between goals I and 2 is analyzed in Elazer Berkovitch et al., The Design of
Bankruptcy Law: A Case for Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations (University of Michigan,
School of Business and Finance, Mimeograph) (1993) (on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly).
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IV. EXISTING PROCEDURES
Although there are many different bankruptcy procedures used around
the world, these procedures fall into two main categories: cash auctions and
structured bargaining. We discuss these in turn, paying particular attention
to their application in the United States and the United Kingdom.
A. Cash Auctions (e.g., Chapter 7 in the United States or Liquidation
in the United Kingdom)
In a cash auction, the company is put on the block and sold to the
highest bidder. Often the company's assets are sold piecemeal, i.e., the
company is liquidated. Sometimes, however, the company is sold as a
going concern. Whichever occurs, the receipts from the sale are distributed
among former claimants according to absolute priority.
In a world of perfect capital markets, a cash auction would (presumably)
be the ideal bankruptcy procedure.'" Anybody who could make the
company profitable would be able to raise cash from some source (a
commercial bank, an investment bank, the stock market) and make a bid
for the company. Perfect competition among bidders would ensure that the
company was sold for its true value.
In practice, there is widespread skepticism about the efficacy of cash
auctions. The feeling is that a combination of transaction costs, asymmetric
information, and moral hazard makes it difficult for bidders to raise
sufficient cash to maintain a company as a going concern (i.e., capital
markets are not perfect). As a consequence, there may be a lack of
competition in the auction and few bids to keep the company whole. The
result will be that some companies are liquidated piecemeal and/or sold at
a low price.
It is worth spelling out a transaction-cost reason for imperfect capital
markets. Suppose a large public company is put on the block. Someone
making a cash bid for the company is, in effect, taking the company private
(unless the bidder itself represents a public company). The bidder's
intention may well be to take the company public again later. The problem
is that in the interim period the bidder is bearing the risk of changes in the
company's value. The bidder will, of course, "charge" for this risk-bearing
by offering a lower price in the original auction. The consequence of this
15. We put in the qualification "presumably" because we are aware of no formal derivation of this
result.
1994]
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is two-fold. First, the going-concern bid may lose to a collection of
piecemeal bids for the company's assets, since the latter achieve risk-
sharing by spreading risk over a large number of bidders. Second,
regardless of who wins the auction, the amount of cash raised will tend to
be lower. 6
The above transaction cost arises because of the difficulty of assembling
a suitable group of investors to be risk bearers for the new company.' 7
Note, however, that there is a natural group of risk bearers at hand: the
former claimants (who were, after all, the previous risk bearers).
Transaction costs would be reduced if bidders could reach this group
directly by offering them securities in the postbankruptcy company. This
is not allowed for in a cash-only auction like Chapter 7, but is a key feature
of the procedure we propose in Part V (and also of Chapter 11).
Neither the above theoretical argument nor the empirical evidence
described in footnote 17 provides much indication of the magnitude of the
imperfections in capital markets. Given this, any bankruptcy procedure
16. The problems of financing a cash bid will be exacerbated to the extent that other companies
in the industry, which may be the natural purchasers of the bankrupt company, are also suffering from
financial distress, because the shock hitting the bankrupt company is industry-wide. See Andrei ShIcifer
& Robert Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN.
4(1992).
17. There is some empirical support for the idea that it is costly to find investors to put up the
cash to buy a public company. One piece of evidence comes from the work on initial public offerings.
This work finds significant costs of going public, at least some of which are attributable to the premium
charged by investment banks for bearing the risk that the offer will not be fully subscribed. (Other costs
are attributable to direct expenses and various forms of asymmetric information.) See Jay R. Ritter, The
Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269 (1987).
A second, more casual piece of evidence concerns workouts. When a company is financially
distressed, it often tries to persuade its creditors to renegotiate their claims by lengthening the maturity
of their debt or by swapping their debt for equity. The question is, why do creditors often go along
with this, rather than pushing for bankruptcy and liquidation? It would seem that the latter strategy
would be rational ifa cash auction could be relied on to generate maximum value, i.e., if bidders could
easily raise cash to buy the company. (Part of the desire for renegotiation can possibly be traced to the
fact that most bankruptcies in the United States are filed under Chapter 11, rather than Chapter 7, and
creditors may prefer to avoid Chapter 11. However, this does not explain workouts in other countries
where Chapter I 1 does not exist.)
A third piece of evidence comes from another area of corporate finance: takeovers. Companies
taking over other companies sometimes offer shareholders a mixture of cash and securities for their
existing shares. In fact, in 1993, 66% of all mergers and acquisitions with value between $100 million
and $1 billion had a noncash component. See MERRILL LYNCH BusmEss ADVISORY SERVICES,
Mergerstat Review (1994). Noncash bids are harder to evaluate than cash bids, so one might expect
that-particularly in a contested situation-bidding companies would prefer to offer straight cash. The
fact that they do not suggests that it is difficult for them to raise cash. (There may, however, be other
reasons why companies make noncash bids, such as the presence of taxes and asymmetric information.)
[VOL. 72:849
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adopted should work well both in the case where capital markets are perfect
and in the case where they are not. The procedure described in Part V has
this flexibility. As we shall see, it consists of an auction in which both
cash and noncash bids for the company are allowed. If capital markets are
perfect, the company will go to the bidder with the highest willingness to
pay-moreover, this bidder can do no better than to offer cash-and thus
the outcome will be exactly the same as in a cash-only auction. On the
other hand, if capital markets are imperfect, the procedure can deliver an
outcome that is superior to that achievable by a cash auction.
B. Structured Bargaining (e.g., United States Chapter 11 or United
Kingdom Administration)
Because of the concern about the effectiveness of cash auctions, a
number of countries have developed alternative procedures based on the
idea of structured bargaining. The basic idea behind these procedures is
that the company's claimants are encouraged to bargain about the future of
the company-in particular, whether it should be liquidated or reorganized
and how its value should be divided up-according to predetermined rules.
The leading example of a structured bargaining procedure in the West is
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code; however, U.K. Administration is
based on similar ideas, as are procedures in France, Germany, and Japan.
The details of Chapter 11 are complicated, but the basic elements are as
follows: creditors' claims are stayed; claimholders are grouped into classes
according to the type of claim they have; committees or trustees are
appointed to represent each class; and a judge supervises a process of
bargaining among the committees to determine a plan of action and a
division of value for the company. During the process, incumbent
management usually runs the company. An important part of the procedure
is that a plan can be implemented if it receives approval by a suitable
majority of each claimant class: unanimity is not required.
We remark that U.K. Administration was introduced in the 1986
Insolvency Act as "the British version of Chapter 11 ."' An important
difference between U.K. Administration and Chapter 11 is that the
administrator (who is an insolvency practitioner) runs the company during
bankruptcy, rather than incumbent management. There are also a number
of differences in the voting rules between the two procedures. To date, the
18. S.I. 1986, No. 1925, as amended by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 1987, S.I. 1987, No.
1919 and S.I. 1989, No. 397.
1994]
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costs of Administration are such that it has rarely been used.
Chapter 11 has been subject to a great deal of criticism in the last few
years. Among other things, practitioners and commentators have claimed
that it is time-consuming, that it involves significant legal and administra-
tive costs, that it causes considerable loss in the bankrupt company's value,
that it is (relatively) soft on management, and that the judges who run it
sometimes abuse their powers. t9
It would undoubtedly be possible to modify Chapter l-and procedures
like it-to improve matters, and a number of suggestions along these lines
have been made. However, we believe there are two fundamental problems
inherent in any structured bargaining procedure that no amount of tinkering
can solve. These problems are associated with the fact that a structured
bargaining procedure like Chapter 11 attempts to make two decisions at
once: what to do with the company, and who should get what in the event
of a restructuring of claims.
Problem 1. Restructured companies do not have an objective value.
Consequently, it is hard to know what fraction of the postbankruptcy
company's securities each group of creditors is entitled to receive. This is
true even if there is no dispute about the amount and seniority of each
creditor's claim. As a result, there can be a great deal of haggling.
Problem 2. Perhaps even more serious, there is a danger that the wrong
decision will be made concerning the company's future. The voting
mechanism is fixed in advance, which means that those people whose
payoff ought not to be affected by the outcome (either because they are
fully protected anyway, or because they are not entitled to anything) may
end up controlling the pivotal votes.
Problem 1 is well understood, having been discussed at some length in
the literature.2" Problem 2 has also been noted but has been subject to
19. For some of the literature on these issues, see David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The
Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19
RAND J. ECON. 157 (1988); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence
on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990);
Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1989); Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. Rsv. 669, 758-59 (1993); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy
Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); and
Lawrence A. Weiss, Restructuring Complications in Bankruptcy: The Eastern Airlines Bankruptcy Case
(Tulane University, Mimeograph) (1991).
20. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 3; Bebchuk, supra note 3. The recent bankruptcy of Macy's
provides a clear example of Problem 1. Senior creditors claimed that the reorganized company was
worth little (implying that they should receive a large fraction of it). Junior creditors and shareholders
[VOL. 72:849
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less analysis. An example may help to illustrate it.
Example A. Suppose senior creditors are owed $100, and the liquidation
value of the company is $90. Assume that if the company were maintained
as a going concern for six months then it would be worth on average $110
(suppose the discount rate is zero). However, there is uncertainty: if things
go well, it will be worth $180; if things go badly, it will be worth only $40.
(The average of $180 and $40 is $110.) Clearly, the value-maximizing choice
is to keep the company going, since $110 exceeds the liquidation value of
$90. However, it is not in the senior creditors' interest to do this. If things
go well, and the company is worth $180, the senior creditors get only the
$100 they are owed. But if things go badly, they get just $40. The average
of these amounts is $70, which is less than the $90 the senior creditors
receive from immediate liquidation.
In this example senior creditors may vote to liquidate the company
immediately rather than enter into a lengthy negotiation that might lead to
the company's being saved. This is in spite of the fact that there is enough
value in the efficient outcome for the senior creditors to be paid off in full:
$110 exceeds the $100 senior debt. Had the senior creditors been paid off,
and the vote left in the hands of the junior creditors and the shareholders
(whose money is at stake), then the junior creditors would have made the
efficient decision about the company's future.
Things may go the other way, though. Consider a variant on Example
A:
Example B. Assume the same facts set forth in Example A, except that the
upside value from continuation is lower--only $120 rather than $180. Thus,
the average value from continuation is $80 (the average of $120 and $40).
In Example B, the junior creditors and shareholders are not entitled to
anything, since the best that can happen to the company is that it is
liquidated for $90, which is less than the senior debt. So the junior
creditors and shareholders ought not to be party to the decision over the
company's future. And yet, the rules of Chapter 11 dictate that they do
have votes, and as a result, they may be in a position to press for
continuation (since they can see the upside potential of $120).21 If the
claimed the opposite. See, e.g., Patrick M. Reilly & Laura Jereski, Macy Strategy Seems to Sway Senior
Creditors, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1994, at A4; Laura Jereski & Patrick M. Reilly, Laurence Tisch Leads
Dissent on Macy Board, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1994, at BI.
21. This is unless the cram-down procedure is adopted. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 676 (1 st ed. 1985). Under cram-down,
junior claimants' voting rights are removed on the grounds that they would receive nothing in
liquidation. Id. (describing the procedure of Il U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988)). The cram-down procedure
19941
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
junior creditors and shareholders have enough votes to veto a liquidation
plan, then at best the senior creditors may have to bribe them to accept
it-which would lead to a violation of absolute priority-and at worst the
company may be inefficiently kept going. Notice that, had the vote been
left in the hands of senior creditors, they would have made the correct
decision about the company's future.22
At this point, it is worth standing back and asking why the various
claimants cannot bargain around the inefficiencies described in Examples
A and B, i.e., why the Coase Theorem does not solve Problems 1 and 2.
Probably the most important reason is that, in the case of large companies,
there are often numerous claimants (bondholders, trade creditors, and
shareholders), which can make negotiation around a given (inefficient)
procedure very difficult and lengthy (due to freerider and holdout problems,
combined with asymmetries of information among claimants).
Consider Example A where senior creditors might vote to liquidate the
company. This outcome could be avoided if junior creditors and sharehold-
ers could bribe the senior creditors not to liquidate, e.g., they could buy out
the senior creditors at a price between $90 and $100. However, the more
numerous and heterogeneous the junior creditors and shareholders are, the
more difficult it is-and the longer it will take-to coordinate such an offer
(each junior claimant will want the other junior claimants to bribe the
senior creditors). As a result, either an agreement will not be reached or
it will require lengthy negotiation (there may be a war of attrition).23
Similar problems arise in Example B, where senior creditors must
collectively decide to make concessions to junior claimants to compensate
them for not pursuing reorganization. It may be easier to achieve
cannot be relied upon, however; among other things, it requires an accurate judicial evaluation of the
company's liquidation value.
22. The empirical work on departures from absolute priority suggests that junior claimants do
indeed have enough power to force concessions from senior creditors, i.e., the problem described in
Example B is relevant in practice. See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical
Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747 (1989). There is less formal empirical
evidence on the problem described in Example A. However, practitioners frequently mention (and write
about) this problem, so it would seem to be a mistake not to take it seriously. Also, the conflict
between the desire of senior creditors to terminate a bankruptcy proceeding quickly, and that ofjunior
creditors to drag it out on the off-chance that there will be something of value for them, seems to have
been a factor in the recent Macy's bankruptcy. See, e.g., Patrick M. Reilly & Laura Jereski, Media &
Marketing: Macy May Seek Shorter Period for Extension, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B2.
23. For a discussion of the bargaining problems faced by companies in financial distress, see
Rajesh Aggarwal, The Capital Structure Holdout Problem: Why Firms in Financial Distress Remain
Overleveraged (Harvard University, Mimeograph) (1993) (on file with authors).
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agreement in Example B, however, to the extent that the number of senior
creditors is relatively small and the creditors find it easier to coordinate
their actions.
A structured procedure like Chapter 11 reduces the severity of the above
bargaining problems by making the majority's will binding on the minority
(this mitigates freeriding and holdout behavior). However, even in this
case, an efficient outcome may not be reached, e.g., because of asymme-
tries of information. Suppose, in Example A, junior claimants are unsure
whether the company's liquidation value is really $90 as opposed to some
lower figure, while senior creditors know the true value. Then junior
creditors may quite rationally "low-ball" the senior creditors by offering
them less than $90 to compensate them for not liquidating. In this case the
senior creditors will turn them down if the true liquidation value is $90,
and a valuable going-concern opportunity will be lost.24
V. AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE
We can summarize the previous discussion as follows. We believe
existing bankruptcy procedures are flawed for two reasons: either they
assume perfect capital markets (as in Chapter 7) or they mix the decision
of what should happen to the company with the decision of who gets what
(as in Chapter 11). We now describe a procedure that does not suffer from
these defects. The key lies in transforming a group of people with different
claims (and therefore different objectives) into a homogeneous class of
shareholders, and then putting the company's future to a simple vote. Our
proposal also avoids bargaining over the division of the pie, because it uses
a mechanical procedure for distributing shares that preserves absolute
priority.'
The philosophy underlying the procedure-and the procedure itself-can
be most easily understood in the case of a company with a single class of
creditors, who are owed D by the company. Suppose the company defaults
on its debt or for some other reason enters bankruptcy. The presumption
is that the company is worth less than D, because otherwise it should have
been able to avoid bankruptcy by borrowing or issuing new equity to pay
24. There is a vast literature on bargaining under asymmetric information. A representative article
is Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole. Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information, 50 REv. ECON.
STUD. 221 (1983).
25. However, our procedure does not avoid disputes over the amounts and seniorities of claims.
Judges and the courts would undoubtedly have a very important role in resolving these disputes under
our procedure, just as they currently do.
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off existing creditors. Given this, the following bankruptcy procedure
seems natural: cancel the company's debts, give all the equity to the former
creditors, and let these creditors-as the new owners--decide what to do
with the company, i.e., whether it should be sold off for cash or reorga-
nized as a going concern. To this end, let the judge supervising the
procedure solicit bids for the company, but permit noncash bids as well as
cash bids. In a noncash bid, someone offers securities in the
postbankruptcy company instead of cash; thus, a noncash bid embraces the
possibility of reorganization and/or recapitalization of the company as a
going concern. The following are some examples of a noncash bid:
(1) The old managers propose to keep their jobs, and offer claimants a share
in the postbankruptcy company;
(2) The same financial arrangement might be offered by a new management
team;
(3) The managers of another company might propose to buy the bankrupt
company, offering shares in their company as payment;
(4) Management (old or new) might induce some debt in the company's
capital structure. One way to do this would be to arrange for a bank to lend
money to the postbankruptcy company (the loan is conditional on the bid
succeeding), and offer claimants a combination of cash and equity in the
(levered) company. Another way would be to offer claimants a combination
of shares and bonds in the postbankruptcy company.
Three months are allowed for bids to be made.26 Finally, after the bids
are in, let the new owners-the former creditors-decide by a simple
majority vote which bid to select. The company then exits from bankrupt-
cy. (At this point, it may be helpful to consult the time line in Figure 1;
some aspects of this time line will be explained later.)
26. The scheme does not depend on this particular time horizon, and adjustments might be
desirable. See, e.g., discussion infra pp. 867-68.
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Figure 1. Time line of proposed new bankruptcy procedure.
Options exercised.
(A) Bids solicited Trade in equity
(B) Rights allocated and options?
II
I I I
Months 0 3 4(approx.) []
Bankruptcy Bids Vote Company
declared, announced exits from
All debt bankruptcy
canceled
=> new
all-equity
company
Note that, for the bidding process to work well, it is important that
potential bidders have reasonably accurate information about the company's
prospects. Part of the bankruptcy judge's job therefore will be to ensure
that bidders have access to the company's books during the three-month bid
solicitation period. Another part of the judge's job might be to evaluate,
and make recommendations about, the bids, possibly with the help of
appointed outside experts (e.g., an investment bank). These evaluations and
recommendations would not be binding, however, and the creditors would
be free to ignore them.
The above is the bare-bones description of the Aghion-Hart-Moore
(AHM) procedure. Let us now discuss two elaborations. First, it is
possible that the company really is worth more than D. This could be the
case if the company was being run inefficiently by incumbent management
prior to bankruptcy, but will be run efficiently postbankruptcy. Under these
conditions, the above scheme overpays creditors-they get equity worth
more than D-and initial shareholders are short-changed. In order to deal
with this possibility, the AHM procedure incorporates an idea attributable
to Bebchuk.27 Each shareholder is given the option to buy out the
27. See Bebchuk, supra note 3.
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creditors for the pro rata value of their debts. (That is, a shareholder who
held 1% of the equity is given the right to buy back up to 1% of the equity
for a price of D per 100%. Note that creditors who are bought out must
relinquish their equity-they cannot hold on.)28  These options are
exercised once the bids are in-so that an assessment of the company's
value can be made-but before the vote. An extra month is allowed for
this purpose (refer again to the time line in Figure 1 above). In addition,
options can be bought and sold (unexercised options expire at month four,
and are thus worthless). The point of these options is simple. Any
shareholder who thinks former creditors are being overpaid can do
something about it; he or she can, on a pro rata basis, pay the former
creditors what they are owed and get their equity in return.
Second, companies often have several classes of creditors. The AHM
procedure can be extended to this case quite easily, again using Bebchuk
options. Suppose, for instance, there are two classes of creditors: senior
creditors owed D, and junior creditors owed D2. Initially, all the equity is
given to senior creditors. However, junior creditors are given options to
buy equity back from the senior creditors for a price of D1 per 100%, while
shareholders are given options to buy equity back from senior and junior
creditors for a price of D, + D2 per 100%. (The scheme generalizes in a
natural way to the case of n classes of creditors.) Again, these options are
exercised after the bids are announced, but before the vote.
To see how this process works, suppose first that the best bid is
perceived to value the company at less than D,. Then no one will want to
exercise their options (the junior creditors will not want to spend D, to get
something worth less; and, a fortiori, the former shareholders will not want
to spend D, + D2), and the creditors will end up with all the equity.
Suppose next that the best bid is perceived to be worth more than D,, but
less than D, + D2. Then the junior creditors will choose to buy out the
senior creditors, but the former shareholders will not want to exercise their
options. Finally, if the best bid is perceived to be worth more than D, +
D2, then the shareholders will buy out both classes of creditors. It should
be clear that these options preserve the absolute priority of claims even
though there is no objective valuation of the company.
The other important point is that at the time of the vote, all claimholders'
interests are aligned. Whether those voting are former creditors or former
shareholders (who have bought out the creditors), they are now all
28. See Bebehuk, supra note 3, at 800.
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shareholders and so have an incentive to vote for the highest value bid.
Of course, there may be a divergence of opinion about the value of the
best bid (or indeed about which bid will win). No matter, because the
scheme is decentralized, everyone can act as they wish. The more bullish
people will buy out the creditors above them, and the others will not. For
larger companies, markets may develop (during the fourth month) in which
shares and options could be traded.2"
Let us take a look at how our scheme operates in Examples A and B.
In Example A, there are two alternatives: liquidate for $90 or keep the
company going for an average value of $110. The big difference between
our scheme and structured bargaining is that if the former creditors as
shareholders get to vote, they will choose to keep the company going
because they enjoy all of the potential upside gains from continuation. Of
course, in this instance the former shareholders will be eager to exercise
their options, since by spending $1.00 they obtain a share worth $1.10 (we
are ignoring junior creditors). That is, the former creditors will get paid
their $100 in full by the former shareholders, and the former shareholders,
as residual claimants, will vote to maintain the company as a going
concern. A good company has been saved.
In Example B, the alternatives are to liquidate for $90 or to keep the
company going for an average value of $80. Here, the former shareholders
will not exercise their options, and the former creditors-as the new
shareholders-will vote to liquidate and receive $90. A bad company has
been shut down.
Notice that Problems 1 and 2 have been resolved without eliminating the
possibility of reorganization. In Example A, incumbent managers are able
to retain their jobs even though they may not have the cash in hand, and
any incentive on the part of the creditors to liquidate the company
prematurely is avoided. In Example B, managers are rightly unable to keep
their jobs. In neither example is there room for haggling. And in both
29. At the same time that our proposal was being developed, two other proposals for bankruptcy
reform appeared in the literature. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); see also Barry E. Adler, A World Without
Dcbt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994). These proposals, like ours, envisage that when a company goes
bankrupt the company's equity is transferred to creditors. Adler's proposal removes the right of
individual creditors to foreclose on a bankrupt company's assets, while Bradley and Rosenzweig's does
not. In both proposals, the company's debt is not accelerated and no bids are solicited. Also, while
both proposals envisage that the transfer of control to creditors will bring about improved management,
neither is very explicit about how this will happen.
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examples, the people who end up voting over the future of the company are
the residual claimants (i.e., those who bear the consequences of their
actions); as a result, the final outcome is the value-maximizing choice.
VI. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In this Part, we briefly raise some additional issues and discuss a number
of practical problems that might arise under our scheme.
A. Treatment of Junior Creditors and Former Shareholders
In our scheme, junior creditors are required, before they receive anything,
to buy out senior creditors. A concern may be that junior creditors do not
have the cash on hand to exercise their options and, therefore, will be
unduly disadvantaged by the need to raise cash.
We have a modification of our scheme that ameliorates this problem.
Once the bids are in, the bankruptcy judge will be able to place a lower
bound on the value of the company, equal to the size of the best cash bid,
V' (an objective amount). Given this, he or she could proceed as if the
firm were worth V', and distribute shares accordingly. If VC exceeds the
amount owed to senior creditors, the junior creditors will receive a fraction
of the shares in the initial distribution. For example, if the senior creditors
are owed $100, and the best cash bid that comes in is for $150, then the
senior creditors would be issued two-thirds of the shares and the junior
creditors would be issued one-third. Of course, there may be a noncash bid
that the junior creditors perceive to be worth more than $150, in which case
the senior creditors would still be getting too much; but in that case the
junior creditors could exercise their options to buy out the senior creditors.
Of course, even with this modification, junior creditors might still be
shortchanged. The worst case would be that there is no cash bid; here
V' = 0, and all the equity is initially allocated to senior creditors. How bad
are things for the junior creditors in such a case? We think not too bad,
for at least three reasons.
First, junior creditors do not collectively have to raise the cash to buy out
the senior creditors. Each junior creditor can act as an individual. The pro
rata cash injection may be quite small (indeed, an individual need not
exercise his options in full; he may choose to exercise only a fraction).
Second, a market for options may well develop during the bankruptcy
process--especially for large firms. (Indeed, the bankruptcy judge might
be obliged to establish such a market.) In this case, junior creditors need
not come up with cash: they could simply sell their options. Third, even
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if some junior creditors are unable to raise the cash, and so are left empty-
handed, they will probably fare no worse than they do under current
arrangements.3"
Finally, it is important to realize that the problem facing junior creditors
who wish to raise cash in order to exercise their options is quite different
from that of a bidder who wishes to make a cash bid for the whole
company. Because junior creditors act individually, no junior creditor who
exercises her option bears much risk; nor does someone who buys the
option and exercises it on her behalf. In contrast, someone who makes a
cash bid for the whole company may bear a great deal of risk." Hence,
there is no contradiction between supposing on the one hand that capital
markets are sufficiently imperfect that noncash bids have a role to play, and
supposing on the other hand that junior claimants will be able to obtain a
reasonable fraction of the postbankruptcy pie by exercising or selling their
options.
B. Claims Disputes
We have so far paid little attention to the question of how the amounts
and seniorities of creditors' claims are established. The adjudication
process is complex and forms an important part of any bankruptcy
procedure, including our own. It may be argued that our time scale of
three months is too short for the purpose of allocating shares and options.
There is a way of dealing with awkward claims disputes without
jeopardizing our scheme, as long as a reasonable proportion of the claims
can be established within the three months: take the claims that can be
established, allocate shares and options on the basis of these claims alone,
30. LoPucki and Whitford examined 43 firms that filed for bankruptcy in the United States after
October 1, 1979, had declared assets in excess of $100 million, and had a plan confirmed by March 31,
1988. They found that the mean return to unsecured creditors was 49.5 cents per dollar, and that the
median return was 38.7 cents per dollar. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining
Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA.
L. RE\,. 125, 142 (1990).
Fisher and Martel studied 236 incorporated firms that filed for reorganization in Canada during the
period 1978-87. They divided the sample into 16 "large" firms (with liabilities in excess of five million
Canadian dollars) and 220 "small" firms (with liabilities below five million Canadian dollars). For large
firms, the mean return to unsecured creditors was 57.7 cents per dollar, and the median return was 30
cents per dollar. For small firms, the mean return was 46.9 cents per dollar, and the median return was
35 cents per dollar. See Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, Facts About Financial Reorganization
in Canada (University of Montreal, Mimeograph) (1994) (on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly).
31. See the discussion in Part IV, supra, about the transaction costs of making a cash bid.
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carry out the vote, and emerge from bankruptcy with the contentious claims
still outstanding. Once these claims have been decided, there could be an
appropriate ex post settling up-with the claimants being given securities
in the postbankruptcy company.32 Notice that the people with contentious
claims do not participate in the vote, but this is not too serious, since one
may presume that they too would have voted for the value-maximizing
bid.3
3
In other words, we do not agree with those commentators who have
argued that the complexity of the adjudication process favors a liquidation
procedure like Chapter 7 over a reorganization procedure like Chapter 11
or like ours.34 Their point is that if a company is liquidated for cash, then
the cash can be held in an interest-bearing escrow account and disbursed
when the claims are resolved. We would argue that something similar can
be done in the case of a reorganization plan. If a noncash bid is voted in,
any subsequent dividends or debt repayments can be placed in an escrow
account and distributed, along with fresh equity, once the claims are
resolved.
To put it another way, we think that a bankrupt company is not so
different from a solvent company that has uncertain claims against it. If
there is a threat of a tort claim, a solvent company carries on operating
until the tort claim is resolved and ex post settling up occurs. The
company is not liquidated just because a tort claim may be established in
the future.
C. Urgent Cases
For some kinds of businesses, the worry may be that three to four
months is too long a period, rather than too short. This is particularly true
of companies with customers and suppliers that, unless the uncertainty is
resolved quickly, will shift elsewhere.
There may be a case for granting the bankruptcy judge discretion to
speed up the process; that is, to hold the vote sooner. The drawback is that
there may be less information available at the time of the vote, and a
32. There are several ways of doing this; one is to give new claimants the same securities that
equivalent creditors elected to hold as a result of the bankruptcy process.
33. We are oversimplifying a little here. Those shareholders who think a senior claim may
materialize later have an incentive to choose a risky reorganization plan since they gain if things turn
out well and do not suffer if they turn out badly. See Example B supra pp. 859-60 for a similar
phenomenon.
34. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Summer 1991, at 13, 32 (advocating auction-oriented bankruptcy reform).
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number of claims may still be outstanding. But, as we have explained
above in subpart B, this need not be fatal to the efficacy of our procedure.
To safeguard against abuse, it would probably be desirable to limit the
bankruptcy judge's discretionary powers to cases in which he had clear
evidence that the normal timetable would severely jeopardize creditors'
claims or the future of the business.
D. Treatment of Secured Creditors
We propose that a secured creditor's collateral be appraised. If the
appraisal value is greater than the debt, the creditor should simply be
treated as if all his debt was senior-i.e., he should be allocated shares, not
options. If his debt is less than fully secured, then he is given an
appropriate mix of shares and options. We do not believe that secured
creditors should have the right to seize collateralized property (unless it can
be shown to be unnecessary to the company's reorganization), since this
could lead to an inefficient dismantlement of the company's assets through
a "me-first" grab. Note that this is also the position taken by current U.S.
bankruptcy law."
Of course, we realize that there is a tension between the view that a
secured creditor's rights to seize assets should be restricted and the view,
which we also hold, that private contracts should be upheld (the secured
creditor's contract may have included the right to seize assets). In some
cases, there may be efficiency gains from letting an outside party exercise
its right to seize a specific asset. Note that the parties may be able to
achieve something like this arrangement-even under our scheme-by
making the outside party the owner of the asset and having the company
rent the asset from him. In this case, if the company goes bankrupt, the
outside party might be in a stronger position to repossess its property (a
bidder for the company could, of course, negotiate with the outside party
for the continued use of the asset if this were desirable)., 6
E. Who Runs the Company During Bankruptcy?
In Chapter 11, incumbent management typically runs the company during
bankruptcy. An alternative is for a trustee to run the company, as in old
Chapter X of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Clearly, this is an important issue
35. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY § 8(c) (1992).
36. In practice, however, U.S. bankruptcy law puts restrictions on the rights of owners to repossess
property from a bankrupt company. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
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for any bankruptcy procedure. Notice that our procedure can be applied
regardless of how this issue is resolved.
F. Debtor-in-Possession Financing
The viability of certain kinds of bankrupt companies (such as retail
stores) can depend to a great extent on management being granted debtor-
in-possession financing, whereby suppliers' credit is placed ahead of
existing (unsecured) senior debt. (Ensuring this financing is often
mentioned as an important role played by Chapter 11.) There is no reason
why a comparable arrangement could not be used during the four months
of our proposed bankruptcy process, with the judge's approval.
G. Partial Bids
We have implicitly assumed that the bids received are for the entire
company. In fact, bids may be for parts of the company. The problem
then arises as to how to deal with overlapping or inconsistent bids. Before
a vote can be taken, a menu of coherent options has to be assembled.
We think that it makes most sense to leave the matter of assembling
"whole" bids in the hands of the judge and his or her appointed agents. It
may well be necessary to solicit supplementary bids for parts of the
company, in order to package a whole bid.37 Although this seems messy,
it should be noted that a similar difficulty-how to bundle or unbundle the
assets of the company so as to maximize cash receipts-is faced in a
Chapter 7 proceeding.
H. Voting Procedures
Another issue concerns the voting procedure per se. If there are only
two bids, it seems natural to have a simple vote between them. However,
with more than two bids, there are many possibilities. Shareholders could
cast their votes for their most preferred plan, with the plan that receives the
most votes being the winner; or shareholders could rank the plans, with the
plan that receives the highest total ranking being chosen; or there could be
two rounds, in which shareholders rank the plans in the first round, with a
subsequent runoff between the two highest-ranked plans in the second
round. One point to note is that thorny issues in voting theory (such as the
Condorcet Paradox) are less likely to arise in the present context, given that
shareholders have a common objective: value maximization.
37. Another possibility is to put the onus of assembling whole bids on the bidders themselves, i.e.,
a bidder for part of the company would have to find someone else to bid for the complementary part.
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I. Small Companies
Our scheme is likely to be most valuable in the case of medium to large
companies with multiple creditors, for which bankruptcy raises the thorniest
problems. However, most bankruptcies relate to small companies, for
which a bank is typically the single main creditor. Under our scheme, the
bank would get all the equity (presuming that it is not bought out) and
could "vote" on whether to liquidate or reorganize the company. In
addition, our scheme allows junior creditors-e.g., trade creditors-to buy
out the bank; trade creditors might have an incentive to vote to keep the
company going because they anticipate profitable trade with the company
in the future. In short, our scheme may also have a role to play in the case
of small companies.
J. Workouts
Many of the problems of bankruptcy plague company workouts. There
is no reason why companies could not, of their own accord, choose our
scheme as a vehicle for facilitating such workouts.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
First, it is worth repeating what we see as the main point of this Article.
Current reorganization procedures are flawed because they mix the decision
of who should get what with the decision of what should happen to a
bankrupt company. We have proposed a procedure that separates these two
issues.
Second, it may help to say a few more words about the philosophy
underlying our procedure. Our view is that a bankrupt company is not
fundamentally different from a solvent company that is performing badly.
In the case of a solvent company, shareholders elect a board of directors
who are entrusted with deciding, on a day-to-day basis, whether to keep the
company going, sell it, or close it down. We believe that the same menu
of options should be available to the claimants of a bankrupt company. In
other words, we do not see why bankruptcy should automatically trigger
the termination of a company via a cash sale (either as a going concern or
in pieces). We see bankruptcy as an indication that something is wrong
with management rather than with the company itself. The appropriate
response is to allow new management teams the opportunity to replace
existing management. Our scheme does this through the device of a
noncash bid. Noncash bids allow for Chapter 1 l-type reorganization plans.
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
However, in our scheme, unlike in Chapter 11, the company's future is
decided by a simple vote-a procedure that is standard for solvent
companies-rather than by a complex bargaining procedure that is never
seen outside bankruptcy.
An interesting insight into how our scheme might work is provided by
the recent takeover battle for Paramount. There were two bidders for
Paramount-Viacom and QVC-and each put in a bid with a noncash
component as well as a cash component. Paramount shareholders chose
between the bids-and the option of keeping Paramount independent-by
what was in effect a vote. (Viacom won the vote.) Thus the choice
Paramount shareholders were asked to make is analogous to the choice
claimants would make in our scheme in the presence of noncash bids.
We noted in Part III that a good bankruptcy procedure should balance
two goals: one is to achieve an ex post efficient outcome, the other is to be
neither too hard nor too soft on incumbent management (so as to encourage
the appropriate behavior prior to bankruptcy). We believe that our
procedure does a reasonable job of balancing these objectives. Note,
however, that the procedure can be modified to be softer or harder on
incumbent management (at some probable cost in terms of ex post
inefficiency), if that is thought to be desirable. For example, incumbent
management could be favored by handicapping other bidders in the
auction-e.g., the auction rules could state that an outside bidder has to win
more than two-thirds of the votes. (Another way to soften the blow of
bankruptcy is to give managers a golden parachute in the form of senior
debt in their company.) Conversely, management could be disfavored by
a requirement that they must win more than two-thirds of the votes to retain
their jobs.
Finally, it is worth repeating a point we made in Part IV. A good
bankruptcy procedure should work well both when capital markets are
imperfect and when they are perfect. Our procedure has this feature. If
capital markets are perfect, the company will go to the bidder willing to
pay the highest amount-moreover, this bidder can do no better than offer
cash-and thus the outcome will be exactly the same as in Chapter 7. For
this reason, while believers in perfect capital markets may not see the merit
of our scheme relative to Chapter 7, they should not be strongly opposed
to it. In contrast, those with doubts about the adequacy of capital markets
should, we feel, find value in the scheme.
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